ASD Essentials (formerly Essential Eight)
Go to our Essential Eight assessment
ASD Essentials is the framework the Australian Signals Directorate is moving to from the Essential Eight. This is a self-assessment of PezPC's own environment against its enterprise IT chapter. No external audit has been performed and no assessor has signed anything off.
Three things make this framework easy to misrepresent, and all three are handled below. There is no overall grade: each action is rated in each domain it applies to, and a domain gets its own percentage. Priority phases are the order ASD recommends working in, not a level anyone has reached. And an Essential Eight grade does not convert into a rating here, so ours stays on its own page rather than being carried across.
This expands one row of the standards table in the main privacy policy. The standard itself is published by its own authority: ASD Essentials.
4 of 8 domains assessed by us, not audited
The percentages below read harshly, and they are accurate, so here is exactly what they mean. ASD rates a principle at its weakest action, and asks whether an outcome is demonstrably achieved rather than whether a control exists, so one missing record can hold a whole principle at not effective. Of the 93 ratings we have made, 0 are fully effective, 18 partially effective, 64 not effective and 11 not assessed. What holds up is what is decided in code: permissions with no bypass, encrypted secrets, required second factors, append-only logs. What pulls the figures down is what a very small team has not written down or tooled: risk management, incident response, vulnerability scanning, network segmentation and central logging. ASD writes this framework primarily for government, critical infrastructure and large organisations, and we grade ourselves against it anyway because the people assessing us will ask.
Results by domain
| Priority phase | Domain | Fully effective | Partially effective | Not effective | % effective | Not assessed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All | Governance and culture | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0% | 0 |
| All | Visibility and response | 0 | 1 | 9 | 5% | 0 |
| 1 | Boundary services | 0 | 2 | 14 | 6% | 0 |
| 1 | Identity services | 0 | 2 | 14 | 6% | 0 |
| 2 | Critical processes and services | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A | 16 |
| 2 | Privileged environments | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A | 16 |
| 3 | Business systems | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A | 13 |
| 3 | User devices | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A | 10 |
Counts are principles, in the format ASD reports them.
What happened to the Essential Eight
ASD published ASD Essentials on 15 October 2026 and describes its enterprise IT chapter as an evolution of the Essential Eight. Its own guidance also speaks of replacing the Essential Eight. Both stay on cyber.gov.au during the transition, ASD has not published a retirement date, and existing regulatory obligations stand until regulators say otherwise.
ASD maps every Essential Eight strategy to at least one principle here, but is clear that a maturity level does not translate into a rating, because the two measure different things. So our Essential Eight assessment stays as it was, on its own page beneath this one. Where the two overlap, each row links to its counterpart.
How to read the ratings
Each action is rated fully effective, partially effective, not effective or not assessed. Not assessed is neutral: the action has not been rated yet or there is not enough evidence to rate it, which is different from falling short.
A principle takes its lowest action rating. A domain's percentage scores each of its principles at 1 for fully effective, 0.5 for partially effective and 0 for not effective, then divides by the number of principles that apply to it.
What we assessed, and what we did not
We used the enterprise IT chapter because PezPC runs its servers and database on hardware it operates, which is the case ASD points to that chapter for. The cloud chapter is for environments delivered entirely through software or platform as a service, and the operational technology chapter is for critical infrastructure operators.
We assessed the four domains ASD says to scope first. Governance and culture and Visibility and response apply across PezPC as a whole. Boundary services here means the reverse proxy and the internet-facing PezNet Portal (its website, licensing, update and catalogue servers and feedback relay), plus DNS through Cloudflare. Identity services means Portal accounts and sign-in, and the accounts we use to administer those services.
ASD's assessment process is written for an organisation assessing its own environment and is not intended for assessing suppliers, with guidance on that promised later. If you are assessing PezPC as a supplier, treat this page as our statement of position, which is what it is.
What PezNet gives you towards your own assessment
A rating belongs to an organisation's environment, so software cannot hold one and PezNet does not claim one. What it can do is carry part of the work on your side, and ASD's guidance gives more weight to evidence showing a control operating than to a statement that it exists.
What it gives you
- Asset inventory with automated network discovery. IT.IDE-01.1 IT.IDE-01.2
- Credential vault using AES-256-GCM envelope encryption, where a fresh second factor is needed before a secret is revealed and the reveal is recorded. IT.PRO-13.2
- Passkeys for phishing-resistant sign-in, from version 0.3.0 once one setting is made. IT.PRO-13.4
- A required second factor at sign-in, set per company from version 0.3.0 and binding everybody who can reach that company. It accepts an authenticator code as well as a passkey, so it is phishing-resistant only where people use passkeys. IT.PRO-13.4
- Least-privilege permissions in a flat model with no super-user, no impersonation and no vendor back door. IT.PRO-12.2 IT.PRO-12.3
- Change history for every create, update and delete, recording the user, the time and the row before and after. IT.PRO-05.3
- End-of-support dates on asset models. IT.GOV-14.1
- Supplier register to hang your own evidence on, which is a register and not an assurance process. IT.GOV-11.1
What it does not do
- Forward logs to a central store. IT.DET-01.2
- Prompt periodic access reviews. IT.PRO-12.1
- Grant time-bound privilege. IT.PRO-05.2
- Scan for vulnerabilities. IT.PRO-06.1
- Detect configuration drift. IT.PRO-04.3
- Look after the host. Operating system patching, application control, backups and network segmentation are yours entirely.
Where the wording comes from
Principle names, action wording and identifiers are from ASD Essentials for enterprise IT and its Assessment evidence guide, published by the Australian Signals Directorate, (c) Commonwealth of Australia 2026, and used under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. The positions and ratings are PezPC's own. ASD has not reviewed or endorsed them.
ASD Essentials for enterprise IT · Assessment evidence guide · Transitioning from the Essential Eight · Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
Governance and culture
| IT.GOV-01.1 | Executive cyber security accountability | Not effective |
Formally define and establish executive and board-level accountabilities for cyber security, including setting, monitoring and adjusting organisational risk appetite, and review these accountabilities at a defined cadence.
Responsibility is held clearly in practice because the team is very small, but no named accountability is documented, no risk appetite is set and nothing is reported on a defined cadence. PezPC has no board, and that is not the shortfall: a small business can name one person. The missing record is.
SOC 2, CC1
· ISO 27001, A.5.2
|
| IT.GOV-08.1 | Executive artificial intelligence accountability | Not effective |
Establish and maintain executive accountability for the use, governance and risk management of artificial intelligence within the organisation.
AI coding assistants are used routinely to help write PezNet. Nobody is named as accountable for that use, there is no policy governing it and no risk assessment of it. PezNet itself ships no AI system.
ISO 42001, A.2.2
· ISO 42001, A.3.2
|
| IT.GOV-04.1 | Cyber security resourcing | Not effective |
Assign sufficient cyber security personnel and resources with the required skills to operate, monitor, maintain and manage the lifecycle of security controls and define cyber security responsibilities within role descriptions.
Security work is done by the same small team that builds and runs everything else. Responsibilities are not defined or allocated in writing, so capacity is not planned against what the controls need.
ISO 27001, A.5.2
· ISO 27001, A.5.3
|
| IT.GOV-04.2 | Cyber security resourcing | Not effective |
Periodically review cyber security resourcing against cyber threat trends, cyber security incident outcomes and organisational changes.
No such review is documented, and nothing puts one on a cycle.
NIST CSF, Govern
|
| IT.GOV-03.1 | Security risk management assurance | Not effective |
Establish and maintain a risk management methodology and plan that is used to assess and treat cyber security risks.
No documented risk assessment, risk register or periodic review. Risks are considered when designing a feature and that reasoning is often recorded in the code and its history, which is not what this action asks for.
SOC 2, CC3
· NIST CSF, Govern
|
| IT.GOV-11.1 | Supplier cyber security assurance | Not effective |
Select and engage suppliers of software, hardware and services on the basis of a cyber supply chain risk assessment proportionate to the risk the supplier introduces, and retain appropriate assurance evidence to support the decision.
Suppliers are few, deliberately chosen and named publicly with what each receives. We accept their standard terms, and no evaluation is performed or recorded before engaging one.
Third parties
· ISO 27001, A.5.19
· ISO 27001, A.5.20
· SOC 2, CC9
|
| IT.GOV-11.2 | Supplier cyber security assurance | Not effective |
Maintain current assurance that suppliers continue to meet their cyber security commitments, and act when that assurance lapses or the supplier's risk changes.
Supplier changes are noticed when they break something, not through a review. No assurance evidence is collected or kept current.
ISO 27001, A.5.22
|
| IT.GOV-14.1 | Legacy system management | Not effective |
Establish and maintain a process for identifying, assessing and treating cyber security risks associated with legacy systems and unsupported technologies through compensating controls, enhanced monitoring and assurance until the systems can be removed or replaced.
No documented process. It would belong in the internal policy set recorded as missing against ISO 27001.
ISO 27001, A.5.1
· Essential Eight: Patch applications
· Essential Eight: Patch operating systems
|
| IT.PRO-14.2 | Cyber security awareness training | Not effective |
Update and provide cyber security awareness training on a regular basis to reflect current threats and operational considerations.
No training programme, so nothing to update.
ISO 27001, A.6.3
|
Visibility and response
| IT.IDE-01.1 | Asset identification | Not effective |
Use an approved asset inventory mechanism that supports automated discovery to detect new and changed physical and non-physical assets.
The information we hold is enumerated publicly, table by table. Infrastructure inventory is informal, with no automated discovery of PezPC's own environment. This is the job PezNet does for its customers, and we do not yet evidence it over ourselves.
ISO 27001, A.5.9
· Essential Eight: Patch applications
· Essential Eight: Patch operating systems
|
| IT.IDE-04.1 | Security risk identification | Not effective |
Identify relevant weaknesses, malicious actor techniques and cyber threat behaviours when undertaking risk assessments and review these inputs on a continuous basis.
Risk assessments are not documented, so there is nothing for threat information to feed. Vendor and ecosystem advisories for shipped components are followed and acted on, without structured collection or analysis.
ISO 27001, A.5.7
· SOC 2, CC3
|
| IT.PRO-13.3 | Identity, credential and access management | Not effective |
Identify unsecured keys, secrets and credentials by regularly scanning codebases, configuration files, file shares and user collaboration platforms.
No secret scanning runs in the build pipeline of either repository, and no scheduled scan covers configuration files or collaboration platforms.
|
| IT.DET-01.3 | Centralised event logging | Not effective |
Establish a centralised event log storage capability that protects logs from unauthorised access or modification.
Application events are written to the Portal's own database. Nothing collects logs from across the environment into a protected central store.
ISO 27001, A.8.15
· ISO 27001, A.8.16
|
| IT.DET-02.2 | Cyber security event detection | Not effective |
Ensure detection logic identifies unauthorised changes, anomalous authentication activity and suspicious software execution.
No alerting on anomalous patterns, no correlation and no automated analysis. The evidence would support an investigation, and nothing tells us to start one.
NIST CSF, Detect
· ISO 27001, A.8.16
|
| IT.DET-03.1 | Cyber security incident identification | Not effective |
Triage alerts and events in a timely manner to determine whether cyber security incident thresholds have been met.
No defined criteria for categorising an event or deciding whether it is an incident. The Notifiable Data Breaches assessment is the one written threshold, and it covers personal information rather than security events generally.
ISO 27001, A.5.25
|
| IT.DET-03.2 | Cyber security incident identification | Not effective |
Use indicators from across identities, applications, data and infrastructure activity rather than isolated signals when identifying cyber security incidents.
No correlation exists across log sources, automated or by procedure.
ISO 27001, A.8.16
|
| IT.DET-05.1 | Detection capability efficacy | Not effective |
Review detection coverage periodically to identify gaps arising from new assets, services or architectural changes.
With no detection logic there is no coverage to review.
NIST CSF, Detect
|
| IT.RES-05.1 | Cyber security incident coordination | Partially effective |
Integrate external coordination obligations into cyber security incident response activities where required.
The external obligations are identified and published: the Notifiable Data Breaches assessment and notification path, the OAIC as the regulator, and the commitment to publish a fix through the update channel and notify licence holders. They are not built into an operational response procedure, because there is none.
NIST CSF, Respond
· ISO 27001, A.5.5
· ISO 27001, A.5.24
|
| IT.RES-03.1 | Cyber security incident response | Not effective |
Use documented, tested and approved cyber security incident response procedures when responding to cyber security incidents.
No documented response procedures and no rehearsed plan with defined roles. Response today would be improvised, which is workable at this size and still not what the action asks for.
ISO 27001, A.5.24
· ISO 27001, A.5.26
|
| IT.RES-04.1 | Cyber security incident insights | Not effective |
Perform post-cyber security incident reviews to identify the security gaps that enabled each stage of the cyber security incident.
No process feeds incident findings back into controls.
ISO 27001, A.5.27
|
| IT.RES-04.2 | Cyber security incident insights | Not effective |
Evaluate the monitoring coverage and cyber security incident response procedures following cyber security incidents.
As above: nothing requires this after an incident.
ISO 27001, A.5.27
|
Boundary services and identity services
| IT.IDE-01.2 | Asset identification |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Maintain current records of assets including infrastructure, operating systems, applications, identities, credentials and data.
Portal identities and the data we hold are recorded precisely, the data publicly. Infrastructure records are informal, and no defined process keeps any of it current.
ISO 27001, A.5.9
· Essential Eight: Patch applications
· Essential Eight: Patch operating systems
|
| IT.PRO-01.1 | Secure system lifecycle |
Boundary services
Partially effective
Identity services
Partially effective
|
Design systems securely to provide visibility, enforce authorised access, protect data, minimise required and default privileges, limit exposed services and remove unnecessary functionality.
Services sit behind a reverse proxy and are not directly exposed, permissions fail closed with no bypass, and failures and sign-ins are logged by default. The principles are held as engineering guidance rather than a maintained standard that changes are reviewed against.
ISO 27001, A.8.20
· ISO 27001, A.8.27
|
| IT.PRO-01.2 | Secure system lifecycle |
Boundary services
Partially effective
Identity services
Partially effective
|
Secure build and deployment processes to enforce controls consistently across systems.
Changes run through source control, a build pipeline and review before release, and the installers are scripted. There is no defined security gate before deployment and no check afterwards that controls landed consistently.
ISO 27001, A.8.25
· ISO 27001, A.8.32
|
| IT.PRO-16.1 | Cyber supply chain security |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Assess the integrity and authenticity of software, components and updates before use, and verify provenance where suitable supplier evidence is available.
The dependency set is small and tracked, but verification of integrity and provenance is not recorded, and there is no software bill of materials or formal supply chain process.
ISO 27001, A.5.21
|
| IT.PRO-16.2 | Cyber supply chain security |
Boundary services
Partially effective
Identity services
Partially effective
|
Use vendor advisories and threat intelligence to maintain awareness of supplier, product and component exposure to compromise, and act within timeframes proportionate to the risk.
Advisories are followed, and known-vulnerable versions are pinned forward when they land, but no response timeframe is defined. Read strictly, ASD's indicators would make this not effective because compromise events reach neither a risk register nor an incident procedure. We have rated what the action achieves and recorded those two absences against IT.GOV-03.1 and IT.RES-03.1.
ISO 27001, A.5.7
· ISO 27001, A.8.8
|
| IT.PRO-13.1 | Identity, credential and access management |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Identify and disable or remove default and unused accounts regularly, permitting exceptions only where the account is documented, justified, hardened and monitored.
Accounts are removed deliberately and deletion is immediate and complete. No periodic review looks for default or unused accounts, on the Portal or on the servers.
ISO 27001, A.5.18
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-13.2 | Identity, credential and access management |
Boundary services
Partially effective
Identity services
Partially effective
|
Store authentication keys, secrets and tokens in approved secure repositories with access controls, including MFA.
Application secrets are encrypted at rest under keys held outside the database, each under its own protector purpose, masked in the administration screens, and those screens need a second factor. We have not assessed keys and tokens held outside the application.
ISO 27001, A.8.24
· ISO 27001, A.8.11
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-13.4 | Identity, credential and access management |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Use phishing-resistant MFA for users authenticating to systems, including from untrusted, external or high-risk locations.
Every Portal account must hold a second factor and passkeys are offered, which meets ASD's indicator for customer-facing services. Authenticator codes are still accepted for staff and administrators, so phishing-resistant MFA is not enforced. This is a clear case of an Essential Eight grade not carrying over: the same arrangement meets Level One there.
Essential Eight: Multi-factor authentication
· ISO 27001, A.8.5
|
| IT.PRO-13.5 | Identity, credential and access management |
Boundary services
Not assessed
Identity services
Not assessed
|
Disable legacy authentication protocols or, where this is not feasible, restrict and monitor their use, apply compensating controls and establish a time-bound decommissioning plan.
The Portal itself signs in with a password and second factor or a passkey, so it has no legacy protocol to disable. We have not surveyed the rest of the environment, so this is left unrated rather than guessed.
|
| IT.PRO-13.6 | Identity, credential and access management |
Boundary services
Not assessed
Identity services
Not assessed
|
Ensure that user, machine, system and service account credentials are unique per system or account, particularly in high-privilege contexts.
Portal accounts are unique, enforced by the database. Service and administrative credentials across the servers have not been reviewed for uniqueness.
ISO 27001, A.5.16
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-12.1 | Least privilege access |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Periodically review and update access privileges in alignment with current roles, duties and business requirements.
Rights are provisioned and removed deliberately. Nothing forces a re-check that a standing grant is still warranted.
ISO 27001, A.5.18
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-12.2 | Least privilege access |
Boundary services
Partially effective
Identity services
Partially effective
|
Grant only authorised administrative roles permissions to create, modify or delete accounts and roles, and access privileged functions or applications.
Portal administrator rights are a single explicit flag, granted deliberately and never inherited, and every screen it unlocks is published. No approval workflow covers high-impact changes, and at this headcount the people approving would be the people asking.
ISO 27001, A.8.2
· ISO 27001, A.5.3
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-12.3 | Least privilege access |
Boundary services
Not assessed
Identity services
Not assessed
|
Provision user, administrative and non-person accounts with only the minimum access and privileges required to perform defined operational functions.
Customer records are scoped to the owning account on every query. The administrator flag sits on an ordinary account, so nothing enforces a separate account for privileged and day-to-day use, and non-person accounts have not been reviewed.
ISO 27001, A.8.3
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-05.1 | Secure administration |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Ensure administrative activities can only be performed from dedicated and hardened environments that are isolated from unprivileged user workloads.
No dedicated administrative environment. Work is substantially remote, there is no endpoint standard, and no network separation between the application, database and administrative functions.
ISO 27001, A.8.1
· ISO 27001, A.6.7
· ISO 27001, A.8.22
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-05.2 | Secure administration |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Enforce explicit session establishment controls before privileged actions are permitted, including the use of time-bound privilege grants.
The administrator flag is standing access, not a time-bound grant. A second factor is required to reach the administration area and catalogue review changes ask for a fresh one, but nothing activates or expires privilege.
Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-05.3 | Secure administration |
Boundary services
Partially effective
Identity services
Partially effective
|
Record all administrative or management actions that modify systems, configurations or controls, including the details of the associated user, timestamp and target.
Changes to the Portal's own tables are recorded by database audit triggers. Use of privileged utilities on the servers is neither restricted nor logged, so coverage stops at the application.
ISO 27001, A.8.15
· ISO 27001, A.8.18
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-04.1 | Secure configuration management |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Define approved configuration baselines, informed by vendor and industry hardening guidance, that disable or remove unnecessary services, insecure settings, and unsupported or weak communication protocols.
Configuration lives in version-controlled files and the installers are scripted, so deployments are repeatable. No approved baseline is defined.
ISO 27001, A.8.9
· Essential Eight: Office macro settings
· Essential Eight: User application hardening
|
| IT.PRO-04.2 | Secure configuration management |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Deploy approved configuration baselines on systems, including infrastructure, operating systems and applications.
With no approved baseline there is nothing to deploy or validate against.
ISO 27001, A.8.9
· Essential Eight: Office macro settings
· Essential Eight: User application hardening
|
| IT.PRO-04.3 | Secure configuration management |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Detect and respond to configuration drift using scheduled technical assessments and, where supported, automated monitoring, based on system criticality and change rate.
No drift detection.
ISO 27001, A.8.9
· Essential Eight: Application control
|
| IT.PRO-06.1 | Vulnerability management |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Identify known software and configuration weaknesses of assets through continuous and repeatable assessment activities, including vulnerability scanning activities.
No vulnerability scanner runs and no penetration test has been done. Advisories for shipped dependencies are followed, but that is not scanning.
ISO 27001, A.8.8
· Essential Eight: Patch applications
· Essential Eight: Patch operating systems
|
| IT.PRO-06.2 | Vulnerability management |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Apply security patches or updates within defined risk-based timeframes or automatically where operational impact is low.
Patches do get applied, and known-vulnerable dependencies are pinned forward. No timeframe is defined and coverage is not tracked.
ISO 27001, A.8.8
· Essential Eight: Patch applications
· Essential Eight: Patch operating systems
|
| IT.PRO-06.3 | Vulnerability management |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities exceeding defined risk thresholds within defined timeframes based on exploitation, exposure, criticality, impact and compensating controls, and verify treatment effectiveness.
No risk thresholds or remediation windows are defined.
ISO 27001, A.8.8
· Essential Eight: Patch applications
· Essential Eight: Patch operating systems
|
| IT.PRO-07.1 | Trustworthy software |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Permit only supported, verified and organisation-authorised software to execute on systems, with exceptions minimised, formally risk accepted, time-bound, monitored and regularly reviewed.
No application allowlisting on PezPC's servers, and no rule restricting what else may be installed on them.
ISO 27001, A.8.19
· Essential Eight: Application control
· Essential Eight: Office macro settings
|
| IT.PRO-07.2 | Trustworthy software |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Restrict administrative and management tooling to approved software sets and executed from only authorised, known locations.
No approved administrative toolset, and no restriction on privileged utilities on the servers.
ISO 27001, A.8.18
· Essential Eight: Application control
|
| IT.PRO-10.1 | Regular and proven backups |
Boundary services
Not assessed
Identity services
Not assessed
|
Back up important data, applications and settings on a defined schedule to secure, resilient storage protected by encryption and immutable, offline, logically isolated or equivalent controls.
The database is backed up, and keeping everything in one PostgreSQL database makes a consistent backup a single operation. The protection of the backup storage and the schedule's fit with a recovery need have not been assessed.
ISO 27001, A.8.13
· Essential Eight: Regular backups
|
| IT.PRO-10.2 | Regular and proven backups |
Boundary services
Not assessed
Identity services
Not assessed
|
Isolate backup repositories from general user environments and production workloads, ensuring they are separated from primary systems to prevent unauthorised access, modification or deletion.
We have not tested whether compromise of a server would reach its own backups.
ISO 27001, A.8.13
· Essential Eight: Regular backups
|
| IT.PRO-10.3 | Regular and proven backups |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Conduct regular testing of backup and restoration procedures to ensure that backups are reliable and capable of meeting defined recovery time objectives and recovery point objectives.
Restore testing is not on a schedule, and no recovery time or recovery point objective is defined to test against.
ISO 27001, A.8.13
· ISO 27001, A.5.30
· Essential Eight: Regular backups
|
| IT.PRO-18.1 | Network segmentation and segregation |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Isolate systems within network zones based on business criticality and trust level, and restrict and monitor inbound and outbound access to explicitly approved pathways and services.
Services are not directly exposed, because they sit behind a reverse proxy. There is no network segmentation between the application, database and administrative functions.
ISO 27001, A.8.20
· ISO 27001, A.8.22
|
| IT.PRO-18.2 | Network segmentation and segregation |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Limit lateral movement between, and within, network segments to explicitly approved pathways and services, based on business requirements and trust levels.
With no segmentation, nothing limits lateral movement once inside.
ISO 27001, A.8.22
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
|
| IT.PRO-09.1 | Content filtering |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Inspect outbound content flows to detect unauthorised transfer of sensitive or high-value data.
No outbound inspection. The compensating design is that there is little to leak: an email address, a display name and billing metadata, with none of a customer's operational records ever reaching us.
ISO 27001, A.8.12
|
| IT.PRO-09.2 | Content filtering |
Boundary services
Not assessed
|
Block outbound network connections to known malicious or untrusted destinations.
Outbound requests to administrator-supplied targets pass through an SSRF guard, which is one narrow control. General outbound filtering from the servers has not been assessed.
ISO 27001, A.8.28
· Essential Eight: User application hardening
|
| IT.PRO-09.3 | Content filtering |
Boundary services
Partially effective
|
Inspect inbound content from external or untrusted sources to prevent delivery of malicious or unsafe content.
Uploaded feedback attachments are constrained by type and size, and content type and extension must agree. Uploads are not scanned for malware.
ISO 27001, A.8.7
|
| IT.PRO-14.1 | Cyber security awareness training |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Ensure all personnel receive cyber security awareness training, that is tailored to how they will interact with systems, applications and data in their assigned roles, before being granted access to organisational systems and data.
No training requirement before access is granted, and no completion records.
ISO 27001, A.6.3
|
| IT.DET-01.1 | Centralised event logging |
Boundary services
Partially effective
Identity services
Partially effective
|
Protect event logs from unauthorised access, modification or deletion, including by encrypting them during transit and at rest and securing the systems and accounts used to store, manage and analyse them.
The sign-in and failure logs are append-only at the application and reached only through administration screens. The people who administer the systems can still reach them at the database, and encryption of logs at rest has not been assessed.
ISO 27001, A.5.28
· ISO 27001, A.5.3
|
| IT.DET-01.2 | Centralised event logging |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Forward high-value, security-relevant event logs and configuration changes from infrastructure, operating systems and applications to a central log storage capability.
Logs stay where they are written. Nothing forwards them.
ISO 27001, A.8.16
· Essential Eight: Restrict administrative privileges
· Essential Eight: Multi-factor authentication
|
| IT.DET-04.1 | Baselined high-risk access activities |
Boundary services
Not effective
Identity services
Not effective
|
Continuously monitor and analyse software execution behaviour on systems to detect where legitimate tools and utilities are being used for malicious purposes.
No monitoring of software execution on the servers.
ISO 27001, A.8.16
· ISO 27001, A.8.18
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| IT.DET-02.1 | Cyber security event detection |
Boundary services
Partially effective
Identity services
Partially effective
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Ensure event logs are normalised, time-synchronised and enriched to support correlation across systems and environments.
Timestamps are stored in UTC and hosts synchronise time by default, though not verified against an approved source. Failed requests carry a correlation identifier, path, address, user agent and account. Nothing normalises logs to a common schema.
ISO 27001, A.8.15
· ISO 27001, A.8.17
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